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As one of the chief architects of President Alfonsfn's program of human
rights prosecutions, Carlos Nino well understands the dilemmas surrounding
a nascent democracy's efforts to punish the crimes of a prior regime, and his
lucid account of the Argentine experience enriches our own understanding.
Citizens of nations confronting similar dilemmas are well advised to heed
Professor Nino's caution against the excessive demands of "maximalists." But
in attributing their views to me, Professor Nino is wide of the mark.'
In different regions of the world, it has been my privilege to work with men
and women who dedicate their lives to transforming the abstract law of nations
into the daily practice of peoples. Their accomplishments are too dearly bought
for me ever to contend, as Professor Nino suggests I have, that a fledgling
democracy should sacrifice the results of their efforts to rigid maxims or to
maximalist demands.2
That international law must "take into account [the] complexities" of
situations prevailing in such countries as Argentina, Professor Nino and I are
in full accord. It is precisely the recognition of those complexities on which
my entire thesis turns. As my article urges, international law does not require
governments to commit political suicide. Doctrines of exception, described in
my article, assure that generally applicable duties do not have this effect.
1. Although my brief observations in this note address what I believe are the crucial issues raised in
Professor Nino's comment, Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights in Context: The Case
of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619 (1991), a number of the views that he attributes to me may create a
misleading impression of the positions set forth in my article. I did not suggest, for example, that the
outcome of the torture trials in Greece could be attributed only to "legal technicalities." Id. at 2624 n.16.
But see Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Dity To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime
2537, 2599-600 n.273 (1991). Nor did I suggest that it was politically feasible for the Alfonsin administra-
tion to set a "short time limit for the trials beyond employing the ... procedures" described in Professor
Nino's piece. Nino, supra, at 2624. But see Orentlicher, supra, at 2599 n.270.
2. These experiences have also made clear to me that hard-won rights must be secured against the
destructive effects of impunity. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the Philippine experience. Shortly
after President Corazon Aquino succeeded Ferdinand Marcos, several of her advisors, who had been human
rights lawyers when Marcos was President, privately told me that they believed prosecutions of military
officials for violations committed during Marcos's tenure would be destabilizing. Several years later, the
same officials told me that, in retrospect, they wished that international human rights organizations had
pressed the Aquino government to institute human rights prosecutions. The government's failure to do so,
they believed, had emboldened the military to launch successive coup attempts, and had further eroded
military discipline. Human rights violations had, following a temporary lull, begun to surge once again.
Human rights lawyers numbered prominently among the new victims.
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Nor are any of the general duties imposed by international law as "blunt
an instrument" as Professor Nino makes them out to be. Professor Nino is
wrong to assume that the duties examined in my article would, if invoked in
Argentina, have bolstered the position of maximalists by vesting their demands
with the authority of "positive international law." I argue that international law
does not require successor governments to prosecute all those who participated
in a past system of human rights violations-as maximalists would have them
do. How, then, could the requirements of international law enable Alfonsin's
opponents to "point[] out that the government was not complying with its
international obligations, or even that it was a sort of pariah in the international
community," because it stopped short of wide-ranging prosecutions?
If the Argentine government erred in its decisions, it erred as a matter of
strategy, not as a matter of law. By retreating from prosecutions already
instituted, the government left the impression that it was too weak to prosecute
those it believed were deserving of punishment. That is, to be sure, a failure
of sorts. But it is merely a political failure-one of nerve rooted in a perception
of the government's own powerlessness-and not a breach of international
law.3
It is, I suspect, on the authority of international law that Professor Nino and
I differ most.' It is flattering, but quite inaccurate, for Professor Nino to
characterize as "Orentlicher's duty" the established obligations of states under
international law to prosecute certain atrocious crimes. I did not create those
duties. They arise, in some instances, by virtue of explicit requirements set forth
in human rights conventions.5 They arise, in others, under treaties as they have
been authoritatively interpreted by international judicial bodies.6 And they arise,
as well, under customary law as interpreted by, among others, the American
Law Institute.' Contrary to Professor Nino's suggestion, they have repeatedly
been the basis of international condemnation and enforcement efforts.8 There
3. Although the Alfonsin government's retreat from prosecutions was not itselfa breach ofinternational
law, the law barring further prosecution of most potential defendants, whose passage was secured by the
Alfonsin government in 1987, established a "superior orders" basis for impunity that is inconsistent with
well-established principles of international law. See Orentlicher, supra, at 2605 n.300-01.
4. Professor Nino finds it implausible that "the population at large" may not be free to overturn
international law by popular plebiscite. Yet it is well established that national law can breach a state's
international obligations, howeversuch a law may have been enacted. See Orentlicher, supra note 1, at 2553,
2597 & nn.62, 260-61.
5. See id. at 2562-68.
6. See id. at 2568-83.
7. See id. at 2583-84.
8. See id. at nn.213, 310 and at nn.204-06 and accompanying text; see also id. at 2573-83 (decisions
of international bodies interpreting human rights treaties to require punishment of grave violations). That
those duties are inadequately enforced, there can be no doubt. Professor Nino's perception that governments
have been unwilling to press other states to institute human rights trials is understandable. The Reagan
Administration took no position on the Alfonsin government's prosecutions, and the Bush Administration
was silent about the pardons granted by Alfonsfn's successor. The U.S. government has been somewhat
more outspoken in pressing for human rights prosecutions in several other countries, such as Haiti and El
Salvador.
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is, of course, an irony-one that I can only regret-in Professor Nino's reluc-
tance to recognize these international obligations: they support the very prosecu-
tions for which he deserves no small measure of credit-and which surely count
among his nation's proudest accomplishments.

